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ABSTRACT
Neural networks provide state-of-the-art results for most
machine learning tasks. Unfortunately, neural networks are
vulnerable to adversarial examples: given an input x and any
target classification t, it is possible to find a new input x′
that is similar to x but classified as t. This makes it difficult
to apply neural networks in security-critical areas. Defensive
distillation is a recently proposed approach that can take an
arbitrary neural network, and increase its robustness, reducing
the success rate of current attacks’ ability to find adversarial
examples from 95% to 0.5%.
In this paper, we demonstrate that defensive distillation does
not significantly increase the robustness of neural networks
by introducing three new attack algorithms that are successful
on both distilled and undistilled neural networks with 100%
probability. Our attacks are tailored to three distance metrics
used previously in the literature, and when compared to pre-
vious adversarial example generation algorithms, our attacks
are often much more effective (and never worse). Furthermore,
we propose using high-confidence adversarial examples in
a simple transferability test we show can also be used to
break defensive distillation. We hope our attacks will be used
as a benchmark in future defense attempts to create neural
networks that resist adversarial examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks have become increasingly effective
at many difficult machine-learning tasks. In the image recog-
nition domain, they are able to recognize images with near-
human accuracy [27], [25]. They are also used for speech
recognition [18], natural language processing [1], and playing
games [43], [32].
However, researchers have discovered that existing neural
networks are vulnerable to attack. Szegedy et al. [46] first
noticed the existence of adversarial examples in the image
classification domain: it is possible to transform an image by
a small amount and thereby change how the image is classified.
Often, the total amount of change required can be so small as
to be undetectable.
The degree to which attackers can find adversarial examples
limits the domains in which neural networks can be used.
For example, if we use neural networks in self-driving cars,
adversarial examples could allow an attacker to cause the car
to take unwanted actions.
The existence of adversarial examples has inspired research
on how to harden neural networks against these kinds of
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Fig. 1. An illustration of our attacks on a defensively distilled network.
The leftmost column contains the starting image. The next three columns
show adversarial examples generated by our L2, L∞, and L0 algorithms,
respectively. All images start out classified correctly with label l, and the three
misclassified instances share the same misclassified label of l+1 (mod 10).
Images were chosen as the first of their class from the test set.
attacks. Many early attempts to secure neural networks failed
or provided only marginal robustness improvements [15], [2],
[20], [42].
Defensive distillation [39] is one such recent defense pro-
posed for hardening neural networks against adversarial exam-
ples. Initial analysis proved to be very promising: defensive
distillation defeats existing attack algorithms and reduces their
success probability from 95% to 0.5%. Defensive distillation
can be applied to any feed-forward neural network and only
requires a single re-training step, and is currently one of
the only defenses giving strong security guarantees against
adversarial examples.
In general, there are two different approaches one can take
to evaluate the robustness of a neural network: attempt to prove
a lower bound, or construct attacks that demonstrate an upper
bound. The former approach, while sound, is substantially
more difficult to implement in practice, and all attempts have
required approximations [2], [21]. On the other hand, if the
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attacks used in the the latter approach are not sufficiently
strong and fail often, the upper bound may not be useful.
In this paper we create a set of attacks that can be used
to construct an upper bound on the robustness of neural
networks. As a case study, we use these attacks to demon-
strate that defensive distillation does not actually eliminate
adversarial examples. We construct three new attacks (under
three previously used distance metrics: L0, L2, and L∞) that
succeed in finding adversarial examples for 100% of images
on defensively distilled networks. While defensive distillation
stops previously published attacks, it cannot resist the more
powerful attack techniques we introduce in this paper.
This case study illustrates the general need for better
techniques to evaluate the robustness of neural networks:
while distillation was shown to be secure against the current
state-of-the-art attacks, it fails against our stronger attacks.
Furthermore, when comparing our attacks against the current
state-of-the-art on standard unsecured models, our methods
generate adversarial examples with less total distortion in
every case. We suggest that our attacks are a better baseline
for evaluating candidate defenses: before placing any faith in a
new possible defense, we suggest that designers at least check
whether it can resist our attacks.
We additionally propose using high-confidence adversarial
examples to evaluate the robustness of defenses. Transfer-
ability [46], [11] is the well-known property that adversarial
examples on one model are often also adversarial on another
model. We demonstrate that adversarial examples from our
attacks are transferable from the unsecured model to the
defensively distilled (secured) model. In general, we argue
that any defense must demonstrate it is able to break the
transferability property.
We evaluate our attacks on three standard datasets: MNIST
[28], a digit-recognition task (0-9); CIFAR-10 [24], a small-
image recognition task, also with 10 classes; and ImageNet
[9], a large-image recognition task with 1000 classes.
Figure 1 shows examples of adversarial examples our tech-
niques generate on defensively distilled networks trained on
the MNIST and CIFAR datasets.
In one extreme example for the ImageNet classification task,
we can cause the Inception v3 [45] network to incorrectly
classify images by changing only the lowest order bit of each
pixel. Such changes are impossible to detect visually.
To enable others to more easily use our work to evaluate
the robustness of other defenses, all of our adversarial example
generation algorithms (along with code to train the models we
use, to reproduce the results we present) are available online
at http://nicholas.carlini.com/code/nn robust attacks.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We introduce three new attacks for the L0, L2, and L∞
distance metrics. Our attacks are significantly more effec-
tive than previous approaches. Our L0 attack is the first
published attack that can cause targeted misclassification
on the ImageNet dataset.
• We apply these attacks to defensive distillation and dis-
cover that distillation provides little security benefit over
un-distilled networks.
• We propose using high-confidence adversarial examples
in a simple transferability test to evaluate defenses, and
show this test breaks defensive distillation.
• We systematically evaluate the choice of the objective
function for finding adversarial examples, and show that
the choice can dramatically impact the efficacy of an
attack.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Threat Model
Machine learning is being used in an increasing array of
settings to make potentially security critical decisions: self-
driving cars [3], [4], drones [10], robots [33], [22], anomaly
detection [6], malware classification [8], [40], [48], speech
recognition and recognition of voice commands [17], [13],
NLP [1], and many more. Consequently, understanding the
security properties of deep learning has become a crucial
question in this area. The extent to which we can construct
adversarial examples influences the settings in which we may
want to (or not want to) use neural networks.
In the speech recognition domain, recent work has shown
[5] it is possible to generate audio that sounds like speech to
machine learning algorithms but not to humans. This can be
used to control user’s devices without their knowledge. For
example, by playing a video with a hidden voice command,
it may be possible to cause a smart phone to visit a malicious
webpage to cause a drive-by download. This work focused
on conventional techniques (Gaussian Mixture Models and
Hidden Markov Models), but as speech recognition is increas-
ingly using neural networks, the study of adversarial examples
becomes relevant in this domain. 1
In the space of malware classification, the existence of
adversarial examples not only limits their potential application
settings, but entirely defeats its purpose: an adversary who is
able to make only slight modifications to a malware file that
cause it to remain malware, but become classified as benign,
has entirely defeated the malware classifier [8], [14].
Turning back to the threat to self-driving cars introduced
earlier, this is not an unrealistic attack: it has been shown that
adversarial examples are possible in the physical world [26]
after taking pictures of them.
The key question then becomes exactly how much distortion
we must add to cause the classification to change. In each
domain, the distance metric that we must use is different. In
the space of images, which we focus on in this paper, we
rely on previous work that suggests that various Lp norms are
reasonable approximations of human perceptual distance (see
Section II-D for more information).
We assume in this paper that the adversary has complete
access to a neural network, including the architecture and all
paramaters, and can use this in a white-box manner. This is a
conservative and realistic assumption: prior work has shown it
1Strictly speaking, hidden voice commands are not adversarial examples
because they are not similar to the original input [5].
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is possible to train a substitute model given black-box access
to a target model, and by attacking the substitute model, we
can then transfer these attacks to the target model. [37]
Given these threats, there have been various attempts [15],
[2], [20], [42], [39] at constructing defenses that increase the
robustness of a neural network, defined as a measure of how
easy it is to find adversarial examples that are close to their
original input.
In this paper we study one of these, distillation as a defense
[39], that hopes to secure an arbitrary neural network. This
type of defensive distillation was shown to make generating
adversarial examples nearly impossible for existing attack
techniques [39]. We find that although the current state-of-the-
art fails to find adversarial examples for defensively distilled
networks, the stronger attacks we develop in this paper are
able to construct adversarial examples.
B. Neural Networks and Notation
A neural network is a function F (x) = y that accepts an
input x ∈ Rn and produces an output y ∈ Rm. The model F
also implicitly depends on some model parameters θ; in our
work the model is fixed, so for convenience we don’t show
the dependence on θ.
In this paper we focus on neural networks used as an m-
class classifier. The output of the network is computed using
the softmax function, which ensures that the output vector y
satisfies 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1 and y1+· · ·+ym = 1. The output vector y
is thus treated as a probability distribution, i.e., yi is treated as
the probability that input x has class i. The classifier assigns
the label C(x) = argmaxi F (x)i to the input x. Let C∗(x)
be the correct label of x. The inputs to the softmax function
are called logits.
We use the notation from Papernot et al. [39]: define F
to be the full neural network including the softmax function,
Z(x) = z to be the output of all layers except the softmax (so
z are the logits), and
F (x) = softmax(Z(x)) = y.
A neural network typically 2 consists of layers
F = softmax ◦ Fn ◦ Fn−1 ◦ · · · ◦ F1
where
Fi(x) = σ(θi · x) + θˆi
for some non-linear activation function σ, some matrix θi of
model weights, and some vector θˆi of model biases. Together
θ and θˆ make up the model parameters. Common choices of σ
are tanh [31], sigmoid, ReLU [29], or ELU [7]. In this paper
we focus primarily on networks that use a ReLU activation
function, as it currently is the most widely used activation
function [45], [44], [31], [39].
We use image classification as our primary evaluation
domain. An h×w-pixel grey-scale image is a two-dimensional
2Most simple networks have this simple linear structure, however other
more sophisticated networks have more complicated structures (e.g., ResNet
[16] and Inception [45]). The network architecture does not impact our attacks.
vector x ∈ Rhw, where xi denotes the intensity of pixel i
and is scaled to be in the range [0, 1]. A color RGB image
is a three-dimensional vector x ∈ R3hw. We do not convert
RGB images to HSV, HSL, or other cylindrical coordinate
representations of color images: the neural networks act on
raw pixel values.
C. Adversarial Examples
Szegedy et al. [46] first pointed out the existence of
adversarial examples: given a valid input x and a target
t 6= C∗(x), it is often possible to find a similar input x′
such that C(x′) = t yet x, x′ are close according to some
distance metric. An example x′ with this property is known
as a targeted adversarial example.
A less powerful attack also discussed in the literature
instead asks for untargeted adversarial examples: instead of
classifying x as a given target class, we only search for an
input x′ so that C(x′) 6= C∗(x) and x, x′ are close. Untargeted
attacks are strictly less powerful than targeted attacks and we
do not consider them in this paper. 3
Instead, we consider three different approaches for how to
choose the target class, in a targeted attack:
• Average Case: select the target class uniformly at random
among the labels that are not the correct label.
• Best Case: perform the attack against all incorrect classes,
and report the target class that was least difficult to attack.
• Worst Case: perform the attack against all incorrect
classes, and report the target class that was most difficult
to attack.
In all of our evaluations we perform all three types of
attacks: best-case, average-case, and worst-case. Notice that
if a classifier is only accurate 80% of the time, then the best
case attack will require a change of 0 in 20% of cases.
On ImageNet, we approximate the best-case and worst-case
attack by sampling 100 random target classes out of the 1,000
possible for efficiency reasons.
D. Distance Metrics
In our definition of adversarial examples, we require use
of a distance metric to quantify similarity. There are three
widely-used distance metrics in the literature for generating
adversarial examples, all of which are Lp norms.
The Lp distance is written ‖x − x′‖p, where the p-norm
‖ · ‖p is defined as
‖v‖p =
(
n∑
i=1
|vi|p
) 1
p
.
In more detail:
3An untargeted attack is simply a more efficient (and often less accurate)
method of running a targeted attack for each target and taking the closest.
In this paper we focus on identifying the most accurate attacks, and do not
consider untargeted attacks.
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1) L0 distance measures the number of coordinates i such
that xi 6= x′i. Thus, the L0 distance corresponds to the
number of pixels that have been altered in an image.4
Papernot et al. argue for the use of the L0 distance
metric, and it is the primary distance metric under which
defensive distillation’s security is argued [39].
2) L2 distance measures the standard Euclidean (root-
mean-square) distance between x and x′. The L2 dis-
tance can remain small when there are many small
changes to many pixels.
This distance metric was used in the initial adversarial
example work [46].
3) L∞ distance measures the maximum change to any of
the coordinates:
‖x− x′‖∞ = max(|x1 − x′1|, . . . , |xn − x′n|).
For images, we can imagine there is a maximum budget,
and each pixel is allowed to be changed by up to this
limit, with no limit on the number of pixels that are
modified.
Goodfellow et al. argue that L∞ is the optimal distance
metric to use [47] and in a follow-up paper Papernot et
al. argue distillation is secure under this distance metric
[36].
No distance metric is a perfect measure of human perceptual
similarity, and we pass no judgement on exactly which dis-
tance metric is optimal. We believe constructing and evaluating
a good distance metric is an important research question we
leave to future work.
However, since most existing work has picked one of these
three distance metrics, and since defensive distillation argued
security against two of these, we too use these distance metrics
and construct attacks that perform superior to the state-of-the-
art for each of these distance metrics.
When reporting all numbers in this paper, we report using
the distance metric as defined above, on the range [0, 1]. (That
is, changing a pixel in a greyscale image from full-on to full-
off will result in L2 change of 1.0 and a L∞ change of 1.0,
not 255.)
E. Defensive Distillation
We briefly provide a high-level overview of defensive distil-
lation. We provide a complete description later in Section VIII.
To defensively distill a neural network, begin by first
training a network with identical architecture on the training
data in a standard manner. When we compute the softmax
while training this network, replace it with a more-smooth
version of the softmax (by dividing the logits by some constant
T ). At the end of training, generate the soft training labels by
evaluating this network on each of the training instances and
taking the output labels of the network.
4In RGB images, there are three channels that each can change. We count
the number of pixels that are different, where two pixels are considered
different if any of the three colors are different. We do not consider a
distance metric where an attacker can change one color plane but not another
meaningful. We relax this requirement when comparing to other L0 attacks
that do not make this assumption to provide for a fair comparison.
Then, throw out the first network and use only the soft
training labels. With those, train a second network where
instead of training it on the original training labels, use the
soft labels. This trains the second model to behave like the first
model, and the soft labels convey additional hidden knowledge
learned by the first model.
The key insight here is that by training to match the first
network, we will hopefully avoid over-fitting against any of the
training data. If the reason that neural networks exist is because
neural networks are highly non-linear and have “blind spots”
[46] where adversarial examples lie, then preventing this type
of over-fitting might remove those blind spots.
In fact, as we will see later, defensive distillation does not
remove adversarial examples. One potential reason this may
occur is that others [11] have argued the reason adversarial
examples exist is not due to blind spots in a highly non-linear
neural network, but due only to the locally-linear nature of
neural networks. This so-called linearity hypothesis appears
to be true [47], and under this explanation it is perhaps less
surprising that distillation does not increase the robustness of
neural networks.
F. Organization
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
the next section, we survey existing attacks that have been
proposed in the literature for generating adversarial examples,
for the L2, L∞, and L0 distance metrics. We then describe
our attack algorithms that target the same three distance
metrics and provide superior results to the prior work. Having
developed these attacks, we review defensive distillation in
more detail and discuss why the existing attacks fail to find ad-
versarial examples on defensively distilled networks. Finally,
we attack defensive distillation with our new algorithms and
show that it provides only limited value.
III. ATTACK ALGORITHMS
A. L-BFGS
Szegedy et al. [46] generated adversarial examples using
box-constrained L-BFGS. Given an image x, their method
finds a different image x′ that is similar to x under L2 distance,
yet is labeled differently by the classifier. They model the
problem as a constrained minimization problem:
minimize ‖x− x′‖22
such that C(x′) = l
x′ ∈ [0, 1]n
This problem can be very difficult to solve, however, so
Szegedy et al. instead solve the following problem:
minimize c · ‖x− x′‖22 + lossF,l(x′)
such that x′ ∈ [0, 1]n
where lossF,l is a function mapping an image to a positive real
number. One common loss function to use is cross-entropy.
Line search is performed to find the constant c > 0 that yields
an adversarial example of minimum distance: in other words,
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we repeatedly solve this optimization problem for multiple
values of c, adaptively updating c using bisection search or
any other method for one-dimensional optimization.
B. Fast Gradient Sign
The fast gradient sign [11] method has two key differences
from the L-BFGS method: first, it is optimized for the L∞
distance metric, and second, it is designed primarily to be fast
instead of producing very close adversarial examples. Given
an image x the fast gradient sign method sets
x′ = x−  · sign(∇lossF,t(x)),
where  is chosen to be sufficiently small so as to be
undetectable, and t is the target label. Intuitively, for each
pixel, the fast gradient sign method uses the gradient of
the loss function to determine in which direction the pixel’s
intensity should be changed (whether it should be increased
or decreased) to minimize the loss function; then, it shifts all
pixels simultaneously.
It is important to note that the fast gradient sign attack was
designed to be fast, rather than optimal. It is not meant to
produce the minimal adversarial perturbations.
Iterative Gradient Sign: Kurakin et al. introduce a simple
refinement of the fast gradient sign method [26] where instead
of taking a single step of size  in the direction of the gradient-
sign, multiple smaller steps α are taken, and the result is
clipped by the same . Specifically, begin by setting
x′0 = 0
and then on each iteration
x′i = x
′
i−1 − clip(α · sign(∇lossF,t(x′i−1)))
Iterative gradient sign was found to produce superior results
to fast gradient sign [26].
C. JSMA
Papernot et al. introduced an attack optimized under L0
distance [38] known as the Jacobian-based Saliency Map
Attack (JSMA). We give a brief summary of their attack
algorithm; for a complete description and motivation, we
encourage the reader to read their original paper [38].
At a high level, the attack is a greedy algorithm that
picks pixels to modify one at a time, increasing the target
classification on each iteration. They use the gradient ∇Z(x)l
to compute a saliency map, which models the impact each
pixel has on the resulting classification. A large value indicates
that changing it will significantly increase the likelihood of
the model labeling the image as the target class l. Given the
saliency map, it picks the most important pixel and modify
it to increase the likelihood of class l. This is repeated until
either more than a set threshold of pixels are modified which
makes the attack detectable, or it succeeds in changing the
classification.
In more detail, we begin by defining the saliency map in
terms of a pair of pixels p, q. Define
αpq =
∑
i∈{p,q}
∂Z(x)t
∂xi
βpq =
 ∑
i∈{p,q}
∑
j
∂Z(x)j
∂xi
− αpq
so that αpq represents how much changing both pixels p and
q will change the target classification, and βpq represents how
much changing p and q will change all other outputs. Then
the algorithm picks
(p∗, q∗) = argmax
(p,q)
(−αpq · βpq) · (αpq > 0) · (βpq < 0)
so that αpq > 0 (the target class is more likely), βpq < 0 (the
other classes become less likely), and −αpq · βpq is largest.
Notice that JSMA uses the output of the second-to-last layer
Z, the logits, in the calculation of the gradient: the output of
the softmax F is not used. We refer to this as the JSMA-Z
attack.
However, when the authors apply this attack to their defen-
sively distilled networks, they modify the attack so it uses F
instead of Z. In other words, their computation uses the output
of the softmax (F ) instead of the logits (Z). We refer to this
modification as the JSMA-F attack.5
When an image has multiple color channels (e.g., RGB),
this attack considers the L0 difference to be 1 for each color
channel changed independently (so that if all three color
channels of one pixel change change, the L0 norm would be
3). While we do not believe this is a meaningful threat model,
when comparing to this attack, we evaluate under both models.
D. Deepfool
Deepfool [34] is an untargeted attack technique optimized
for the L2 distance metric. It is efficient and produces closer
adversarial examples than the L-BFGS approach discussed
earlier.
The authors construct Deepfool by imagining that the neural
networks are totally linear, with a hyperplane separating each
class from another. From this, they analytically derive the
optimal solution to this simplified problem, and construct the
adversarial example.
Then, since neural networks are not actually linear, they take
a step towards that solution, and repeat the process a second
time. The search terminates when a true adversarial example
is found.
The exact formulation used is rather sophisticated; inter-
ested readers should refer to the original work [34].
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Before we develop our attack algorithms to break distilla-
tion, we describe how we train the models on which we will
evaluate our attacks.
5We verified this via personal communication with the authors.
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Layer Type MNIST Model CIFAR Model
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×32 3×3×64
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×32 3×3×64
Max Pooling 2×2 2×2
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×64 3×3×128
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×64 3×3×128
Max Pooling 2×2 2×2
Fully Connected + ReLU 200 256
Fully Connected + ReLU 200 256
Softmax 10 10
TABLE I
MODEL ARCHITECTURES FOR THE MNIST AND CIFAR MODELS. THIS
ARCHITECTURE IS IDENTICAL TO THAT OF THE ORIGINAL DEFENSIVE
DISTILLATION WORK. [39]
Parameter MNIST Model CIFAR Model
Learning Rate 0.1 0.01 (decay 0.5)
Momentum 0.9 0.9 (decay 0.5)
Delay Rate - 10 epochs
Dropout 0.5 0.5
Batch Size 128 128
Epochs 50 50
TABLE II
MODEL PARAMETERS FOR THE MNIST AND CIFAR MODELS. THESE
PARAMETERS ARE IDENTICAL TO THAT OF THE ORIGINAL DEFENSIVE
DISTILLATION WORK. [39]
We train two networks for the MNIST [28] and CIFAR-10
[24] classification tasks, and use one pre-trained network for
the ImageNet classification task [41]. Our models and training
approaches are identical to those presented in [39]. We achieve
99.5% accuracy on MNIST, comparable to the state of the
art. On CIFAR-10, we achieve 80% accuracy, identical to the
accuracy given in the distillation work. 6
MNIST and CIFAR-10. The model architecture is given in
Table I and the hyperparameters selected in Table II. We use
a momentum-based SGD optimizer during training.
The CIFAR-10 model significantly overfits the training data
even with dropout: we obtain a final training cross-entropy
loss of 0.05 with accuracy 98%, compared to a validation
loss of 1.2 with validation accuracy 80%. We do not alter
the network by performing image augmentation or adding
additional dropout as that was not done in [39].
ImageNet. Along with considering MNIST and CIFAR,
which are both relatively small datasets, we also consider
the ImageNet dataset. Instead of training our own ImageNet
model, we use the pre-trained Inception v3 network [45],
which achieves 96% top-5 accuracy (that is, the probability
that the correct class is one of the five most likely as reported
by the network is 96%). Inception takes images as 299×299×3
dimensional vectors.
6This is compared to the state-of-the-art result of 95% [12], [44], [31].
However, in order to provide the most accurate comparison to the original
work, we feel it is important to reproduce their model architectures.
V. OUR APPROACH
We now turn to our approach for constructing adversarial
examples. To begin, we rely on the initial formulation of
adversarial examples [46] and formally define the problem of
finding an adversarial instance for an image x as follows:
minimize D(x, x+ δ)
such that C(x+ δ) = t
x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
where x is fixed, and the goal is to find δ that minimizes
D(x, x+δ). That is, we want to find some small change δ that
we can make to an image x that will change its classification,
but so that the result is still a valid image. Here D is some
distance metric; for us, it will be either L0, L2, or L∞ as
discussed earlier.
We solve this problem by formulating it as an appropriate
optimization instance that can be solved by existing optimiza-
tion algorithms. There are many possible ways to do this;
we explore the space of formulations and empirically identify
which ones lead to the most effective attacks.
A. Objective Function
The above formulation is difficult for existing algorithms
to solve directly, as the constraint C(x + δ) = t is highly
non-linear. Therefore, we express it in a different form that is
better suited for optimization. We define an objective function
f such that C(x+ δ) = t if and only if f(x+ δ) ≤ 0. There
are many possible choices for f :
f1(x
′) = −lossF,t(x′) + 1
f2(x
′) = (max
i6=t
(F (x′)i)− F (x′)t)+
f3(x
′) = softplus(max
i 6=t
(F (x′)i)− F (x′)t)− log(2)
f4(x
′) = (0.5− F (x′)t)+
f5(x
′) = − log(2F (x′)t − 2)
f6(x
′) = (max
i 6=t
(Z(x′)i)− Z(x′)t)+
f7(x
′) = softplus(max
i 6=t
(Z(x′)i)− Z(x′)t)− log(2)
where s is the correct classification, (e)+ is short-hand for
max(e, 0), softplus(x) = log(1 + exp(x)), and lossF,s(x) is
the cross entropy loss for x.
Notice that we have adjusted some of the above formula by
adding a constant; we have done this only so that the function
respects our definition. This does not impact the final result,
as it just scales the minimization function.
Now, instead of formulating the problem as
minimize D(x, x+ δ)
such that f(x+ δ) ≤ 0
x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
we use the alternative formulation:
minimize D(x, x+ δ) + c · f(x+ δ)
such that x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
6
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Fig. 2. Sensitivity on the constant c. We plot the L2 distance of the adversarial
example computed by gradient descent as a function of c, for objective
function f6. When c < .1, the attack rarely succeeds. After c > 1, the
attack becomes less effective, but always succeeds.
where c > 0 is a suitably chosen constant. These two are
equivalent, in the sense that there exists c > 0 such that the
optimal solution to the latter matches the optimal solution to
the former. After instantiating the distance metric D with an
lp norm, the problem becomes: given x, find δ that solves
minimize ‖δ‖p + c · f(x+ δ)
such that x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
Choosing the constant c.
Empirically, we have found that often the best way to choose
c is to use the smallest value of c for which the resulting
solution x∗ has f(x∗) ≤ 0. This causes gradient descent to
minimize both of the terms simultaneously instead of picking
only one to optimize over first.
We verify this by running our f6 formulation (which we
found most effective) for values of c spaced uniformly (on a
log scale) from c = 0.01 to c = 100 on the MNIST dataset.
We plot this line in Figure 2. 7
Further, we have found that if choose the smallest c such
that f(x∗) ≤ 0, the solution is within 5% of optimal 70% of
the time, and within 30% of optimal 98% of the time, where
“optimal” refers to the solution found using the best value of
c. Therefore, in our implementations we use modified binary
search to choose c.
7The corresponding figures for other objective functions are similar; we
omit them for brevity.
B. Box constraints
To ensure the modification yields a valid image, we have a
constraint on δ: we must have 0 ≤ xi+ δi ≤ 1 for all i. In the
optimization literature, this is known as a “box constraint.”
Previous work uses a particular optimization algorithm, L-
BFGS-B, which supports box constraints natively.
We investigate three different methods of approaching this
problem.
1) Projected gradient descent performs one step of standard
gradient descent, and then clips all the coordinates to be
within the box.
This approach can work poorly for gradient descent
approaches that have a complicated update step (for
example, those with momentum): when we clip the
actual xi, we unexpectedly change the input to the next
iteration of the algorithm.
2) Clipped gradient descent does not clip xi on each
iteration; rather, it incorporates the clipping into the
objective function to be minimized. In other words, we
replace f(x + δ) with f(min(max(x + δ, 0), 1)), with
the min and max taken component-wise.
While solving the main issue with projected gradient de-
scent, clipping introduces a new problem: the algorithm
can get stuck in a flat spot where it has increased some
component xi to be substantially larger than the maxi-
mum allowed. When this happens, the partial derivative
becomes zero, so even if some improvement is possible
by later reducing xi, gradient descent has no way to
detect this.
3) Change of variables introduces a new variable w and
instead of optimizing over the variable δ defined above,
we apply a change-of-variables and optimize over w,
setting
δi =
1
2
(tanh(wi) + 1)− xi.
Since −1 ≤ tanh(wi) ≤ 1, it follows that 0 ≤ xi+δi ≤
1, so the solution will automatically be valid. 8
We can think of this approach as a smoothing of clipped
gradient descent that eliminates the problem of getting
stuck in extreme regions.
These methods allow us to use other optimization algo-
rithms that don’t natively support box constraints. We use the
Adam [23] optimizer almost exclusively, as we have found it to
be the most effective at quickly finding adversarial examples.
We tried three solvers — standard gradient descent, gradient
descent with momentum, and Adam — and all three produced
identical-quality solutions. However, Adam converges substan-
tially more quickly than the others.
C. Evaluation of approaches
For each possible objective function f(·) and method to
enforce the box constraint, we evaluate the quality of the
adversarial examples found.
8Instead of scaling by 1
2
we scale by 1
2
+  to avoid dividing by zero.
7
Best Case Average Case Worst Case
Change of Clipped Projected Change of Clipped Projected Change of Clipped Projected
Variable Descent Descent Variable Descent Descent Variable Descent Descent
mean prob mean prob mean prob mean prob mean prob mean prob mean prob mean prob mean prob
f1 2.46 100% 2.93 100% 2.31 100% 4.35 100% 5.21 100% 4.11 100% 7.76 100% 9.48 100% 7.37 100%
f2 4.55 80% 3.97 83% 3.49 83% 3.22 44% 8.99 63% 15.06 74% 2.93 18% 10.22 40% 18.90 53%
f3 4.54 77% 4.07 81% 3.76 82% 3.47 44% 9.55 63% 15.84 74% 3.09 17% 11.91 41% 24.01 59%
f4 5.01 86% 6.52 100% 7.53 100% 4.03 55% 7.49 71% 7.60 71% 3.55 24% 4.25 35% 4.10 35%
f5 1.97 100% 2.20 100% 1.94 100% 3.58 100% 4.20 100% 3.47 100% 6.42 100% 7.86 100% 6.12 100%
f6 1.94 100% 2.18 100% 1.95 100% 3.47 100% 4.11 100% 3.41 100% 6.03 100% 7.50 100% 5.89 100%
f7 1.96 100% 2.21 100% 1.94 100% 3.53 100% 4.14 100% 3.43 100% 6.20 100% 7.57 100% 5.94 100%
TABLE III
EVALUATION OF ALL COMBINATIONS OF ONE OF THE SEVEN POSSIBLE OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS WITH ONE OF THE THREE BOX CONSTRAINT ENCODINGS.
WE SHOW THE AVERAGE L2 DISTORTION, THE STANDARD DEVIATION, AND THE SUCCESS PROBABILITY (FRACTION OF INSTANCES FOR WHICH AN
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLE CAN BE FOUND). EVALUATED ON 1000 RANDOM INSTANCES. WHEN THE SUCCESS IS NOT 100%, MEAN IS FOR SUCCESSFUL
ATTACKS ONLY.
To choose the optimal c, we perform 20 iterations of binary
search over c. For each selected value of c, we run 10, 000
iterations of gradient descent with the Adam optimizer. 9
The results of this analysis are in Table III. We evaluate
the quality of the adversarial examples found on the MNIST
and CIFAR datasets. The relative ordering of each objective
function is identical between the two datasets, so for brevity
we report only results for MNIST.
There is a factor of three difference in quality between the
best objective function and the worst. The choice of method
for handling box constraints does not impact the quality of
results as significantly for the best minimization functions.
In fact, the worst performing objective function, cross
entropy loss, is the approach that was most suggested in the
literature previously [46], [42].
Why are some loss functions better than others? When c =
0, gradient descent will not make any move away from the
initial image. However, a large c often causes the initial steps
of gradient descent to perform in an overly-greedy manner,
only traveling in the direction which can most easily reduce
f and ignoring the D loss — thus causing gradient descent to
find sub-optimal solutions.
This means that for loss function f1 and f4, there is no
good constant c that is useful throughout the duration of
the gradient descent search. Since the constant c weights the
relative importance of the distance term and the loss term, in
order for a fixed constant c to be useful, the relative value of
these two terms should remain approximately equal. This is
not the case for these two loss functions.
To explain why this is the case, we will have to take a side
discussion to analyze how adversarial examples exist. Consider
a valid input x and an adversarial example x′ on a network.
What does it look like as we linearly interpolate from x to
x′? That is, let y = αx+(1−α)x′ for α ∈ [0, 1]. It turns out the
value of Z(·)t is mostly linear from the input to the adversarial
example, and therefore the F (·)t is a logistic. We verify this
fact empirically by constructing adversarial examples on the
9Adam converges to 95% of optimum within 1, 000 iterations 92% of the
time. For completeness we run it for 10, 000 iterations at each step.
first 1, 000 test images on both the MNIST and CIFAR dataset
with our approach, and find the Pearson correlation coefficient
r > .9.
Given this, consider loss function f4 (the argument for f1 is
similar). In order for the gradient descent attack to make any
change initially, the constant c will have to be large enough
that
 < c(f1(x+ )− f1(x))
or, as → 0,
1/c < |∇f1(x)|
implying that c must be larger than the inverse of the gradient
to make progress, but the gradient of f1 is identical to F (·)t
so will be tiny around the initial image, meaning c will have
to be extremely large.
However, as soon as we leave the immediate vicinity of
the initial image, the gradient of ∇f1(x + δ) increases at an
exponential rate, making the large constant c cause gradient
descent to perform in an overly greedy manner.
We verify all of this theory empirically. When we run our
attack trying constants chosen from 10−10 to 1010 the average
constant for loss function f4 was 106.
The average gradient of the loss function f1 around the valid
image is 2−20 but 2−1 at the closest adversarial example. This
means c is a million times larger than it has to be, causing
the loss function f4 and f1 to perform worse than any of the
others.
D. Discretization
We model pixel intensities as a (continuous) real number in
the range [0, 1]. However, in a valid image, each pixel intensity
must be a (discrete) integer in the range {0, 1, . . . , 255}. This
additional requirement is not captured in our formulation.
In practice, we ignore the integrality constraints, solve the
continuous optimization problem, and then round to the nearest
integer: the intensity of the ith pixel becomes b255(xi+ δi)e.
This rounding will slightly degrade the quality of the
adversarial example. If we need to restore the attack quality,
we perform greedy search on the lattice defined by the discrete
8
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Fig. 3. Our L2 adversary applied to the MNIST dataset performing a targeted
attack for every source/target pair. Each digit is the first image in the dataset
with that label.
solutions by changing one pixel value at a time. This greedy
search never failed for any of our attacks.
Prior work has largely ignored the integrality constraints.10
For instance, when using the fast gradient sign attack with  =
0.1 (i.e., changing pixel values by 10%), discretization rarely
affects the success rate of the attack. In contrast, in our work,
we are able to find attacks that make much smaller changes
to the images, so discretization effects cannot be ignored. We
take care to always generate valid images; when reporting the
success rate of our attacks, they always are for attacks that
include the discretization post-processing.
VI. OUR THREE ATTACKS
A. Our L2 Attack
Putting these ideas together, we obtain a method for finding
adversarial examples that will have low distortion in the L2
metric. Given x, we choose a target class t (such that we have
t 6= C∗(x)) and then search for w that solves
minimize ‖1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)− x‖22 + c · f(
1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)
with f defined as
f(x′) = max(max{Z(x′)i : i 6= t} − Z(x′)t,−κ).
This f is based on the best objective function found earlier,
modified slightly so that we can control the confidence with
which the misclassification occurs by adjusting κ. The param-
eter κ encourages the solver to find an adversarial instance
x′ that will be classified as class t with high confidence. We
set κ = 0 for our attacks but we note here that a side benefit
10One exception: The JSMA attack [38] handles this by only setting the
output value to either 0 or 255.
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Fig. 4. Our L0 adversary applied to the MNIST dataset performing a targeted
attack for every source/target pair. Each digit is the first image in the dataset
with that label.
of this formulation is it allows one to control for the desired
confidence. This is discussed further in Section VIII-D.
Figure 3 shows this attack applied to our MNIST model
for each source digit and target digit. Almost all attacks are
visually indistinguishable from the original digit.
A comparable figure (Figure 12) for CIFAR is in the ap-
pendix. No attack is visually distinguishable from the baseline
image.
Multiple starting-point gradient descent. The main problem
with gradient descent is that its greedy search is not guaranteed
to find the optimal solution and can become stuck in a local
minimum. To remedy this, we pick multiple random starting
points close to the original image and run gradient descent
from each of those points for a fixed number of iterations.
We randomly sample points uniformly from the ball of radius
r, where r is the closest adversarial example found so far.
Starting from multiple starting points reduces the likelihood
that gradient descent gets stuck in a bad local minimum.
B. Our L0 Attack
The L0 distance metric is non-differentiable and therefore
is ill-suited for standard gradient descent. Instead, we use an
iterative algorithm that, in each iteration, identifies some pixels
that don’t have much effect on the classifier output and then
fixes those pixels, so their value will never be changed. The
set of fixed pixels grows in each iteration until we have, by
process of elimination, identified a minimal (but possibly not
minimum) subset of pixels that can be modified to generate an
adversarial example. In each iteration, we use our L2 attack
to identify which pixels are unimportant.
In more detail, on each iteration, we call the L2 adversary,
restricted to only modify the pixels in the allowed set. Let
9
δ be the solution returned from the L2 adversary on input
image x, so that x+ δ is an adversarial example. We compute
g = ∇f(x + δ) (the gradient of the objective function,
evaluated at the adversarial instance). We then select the pixel
i = argmini gi · δi and fix i, i.e., remove i from the allowed
set.11 The intuition is that gi ·δi tells us how much reduction to
f(·) we obtain from the ith pixel of the image, when moving
from x to x + δ: gi tells us how much reduction in f we
obtain, per unit change to the ith pixel, and we multiply this
by how much the ith pixel has changed. This process repeats
until the L2 adversary fails to find an adversarial example.
There is one final detail required to achieve strong results:
choosing a constant c to use for the L2 adversary. To do this,
we initially set c to a very low value (e.g., 10−4). We then
run our L2 adversary at this c-value. If it fails, we double c
and try again, until it is successful. We abort the search if c
exceeds a fixed threshold (e.g., 1010).
JSMA grows a set — initially empty — of pixels that are
allowed to be changed and sets the pixels to maximize the total
loss. In contrast, our attack shrinks the set of pixels — initially
containing every pixel — that are allowed to be changed.
Our algorithm is significantly more effective than JSMA
(see Section VII for an evaluation). It is also efficient: we
introduce optimizations that make it about as fast as our L2
attack with a single starting point on MNIST and CIFAR; it is
substantially slower on ImageNet. Instead of starting gradient
descent in each iteration from the initial image, we start the
gradient descent from the solution found on the previous
iteration (“warm-start”). This dramatically reduces the number
of rounds of gradient descent needed during each iteration, as
the solution with k pixels held constant is often very similar
to the solution with k + 1 pixels held constant.
Figure 4 shows the L0 attack applied to one digit of each
source class, targeting each target class, on the MNIST dataset.
The attacks are visually noticeable, implying the L0 attack is
more difficult than L2. Perhaps the worst case is that of a 7
being made to classify as a 6; interestingly, this attack for L2
is one of the only visually distinguishable attacks.
A comparable figure (Figure 11) for CIFAR is in the
appendix.
C. Our L∞ Attack
The L∞ distance metric is not fully differentiable and
standard gradient descent does not perform well for it. We
experimented with naively optimizing
minimize c · f(x+ δ) + ‖δ‖∞
However, we found that gradient descent produces very poor
results: the ‖δ‖∞ term only penalizes the largest (in absolute
value) entry in δ and has no impact on any of the other. As
such, gradient descent very quickly becomes stuck oscillating
between two suboptimal solutions. Consider a case where δi =
0.5 and δj = 0.5 − . The L∞ norm will only penalize δi,
11Selecting the index i that minimizes δi is simpler, but it yields results
with 1.5× higher L0 distortion.
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Fig. 5. Our L∞ adversary applied to the MNIST dataset performing a targeted
attack for every source/target pair. Each digit is the first image in the dataset
with that label.
not δj , and ∂∂δj ‖δ‖∞ will be zero at this point. Thus, the
gradient imposes no penalty for increasing δj , even though it
is already large. On the next iteration we might move to a
position where δj is slightly larger than δi, say δi = 0.5− ′
and δj = 0.5 + ′′, a mirror image of where we started. In
other words, gradient descent may oscillate back and forth
across the line δi = δj = 0.5, making it nearly impossible to
make progress.
We resolve this issue using an iterative attack. We replace
the L2 term in the objective function with a penalty for any
terms that exceed τ (initially 1, decreasing in each iteration).
This prevents oscillation, as this loss term penalizes all large
values simultaneously. Specifically, in each iteration we solve
minimize c · f(x+ δ) + ·
∑
i
[
(δi − τ)+
]
After each iteration, if δi < τ for all i, we reduce τ by a factor
of 0.9 and repeat; otherwise, we terminate the search.
Again we must choose a good constant c to use for the
L∞ adversary. We take the same approach as we do for the
L0 attack: initially set c to a very low value and run the L∞
adversary at this c-value. If it fails, we double c and try again,
until it is successful. We abort the search if c exceeds a fixed
threshold.
Using “warm-start” for gradient descent in each iteration,
this algorithm is about as fast as our L2 algorithm (with a
single starting point).
Figure 5 shows the L∞ attack applied to one digit of each
source class, targeting each target class, on the MNSIT dataset.
While most differences are not visually noticeable, a few are.
Again, the worst case is that of a 7 being made to classify as
a 6.
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A comparable figure (Figure 13) for CIFAR is in the ap-
pendix. No attack is visually distinguishable from the baseline
image.
VII. ATTACK EVALUATION
We compare our targeted attacks to the best results pre-
viously reported in prior publications, for each of the three
distance metrics.
We re-implement Deepfool, fast gradient sign, and iterative
gradient sign. For fast gradient sign, we search over  to find
the smallest distance that generates an adversarial example;
failures is returned if no  produces the target class. Our
iterative gradient sign method is similar: we search over 
(fixing α = 1256 ) and return the smallest successful.
For JSMA we use the implementation in CleverHans [35]
with only slight modification (we improve performance by
50× with no impact on accuracy).
JSMA is unable to run on ImageNet due to an inherent
significant computational cost: recall that JSMA performs
search for a pair of pixels p, q that can be changed together
that make the target class more likely and other classes less
likely. ImageNet represents images as 299× 299× 3 vectors,
so searching over all pairs of pixels would require 236 work
on each step of the calculation. If we remove the search over
pairs of pixels, the success of JSMA falls off dramatically. We
therefore report it as failing always on ImageNet.
We report success if the attack produced an adversarial
example with the correct target label, no matter how much
change was required. Failure indicates the case where the
attack was entirely unable to succeed.
We evaluate on the first 1, 000 images in the test set on
CIFAR and MNSIT. On ImageNet, we report on 1, 000 images
that were initially classified correctly by Inception v3 12. On
ImageNet we approximate the best-case and worst-case results
by choosing 100 target classes (10%) at random.
The results are found in Table IV for MNIST and CIFAR,
and Table V for ImageNet. 13
For each distance metric, across all three datasets, our
attacks find closer adversarial examples than the previous
state-of-the-art attacks, and our attacks never fail to find an
adversarial example. Our L0 and L2 attacks find adversarial
examples with 2× to 10× lower distortion than the best pre-
viously published attacks, and succeed with 100% probability.
Our L∞ attacks are comparable in quality to prior work, but
their success rate is higher. Our L∞ attacks on ImageNet are so
successful that we can change the classification of an image
to any desired label by only flipping the lowest bit of each
pixel, a change that would be impossible to detect visually.
As the learning task becomes increasingly more difficult, the
previous attacks produce worse results, due to the complexity
of the model. In contrast, our attacks perform even better as
the task complexity increases. We have found JSMA is unable
12Otherwise the best-case attack results would appear to succeed extremely
often artificially low due to the relatively low top-1 accuracy
13The complete code to reproduce these tables and figures is available
online at http://nicholas.carlini.com/code/nn robust attacks.
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Fig. 6. Targeted attacks for each of the 10 MNIST digits where the starting
image is totally black for each of the three distance metrics.
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Fig. 7. Targeted attacks for each of the 10 MNIST digits where the starting
image is totally white for each of the three distance metrics.
to find targeted L0 adversarial examples on ImageNet, whereas
ours is able to with 100% success.
It is important to realize that the results between models
are not directly comparable. For example, even though a L0
adversary must change 10 times as many pixels to switch an
ImageNet classification compared to a MNIST classification,
ImageNet has 114× as many pixels and so the fraction of
pixels that must change is significantly smaller.
Generating synthetic digits. With our targeted adversary,
we can start from any image we want and find adversarial
examples of each given target. Using this, in Figure 6 we
show the minimum perturbation to an entirely-black image
required to make it classify as each digit, for each of the
distance metrics.
This experiment was performed for the L0 task previously
[38], however when mounting their attack, “for classes 0, 2,
3 and 5 one can clearly recognize the target digit.” With our
more powerful attacks, none of the digits are recognizable.
Figure 7 performs the same analysis starting from an all-white
image.
Notice that the all-black image requires no change to
become a digit 1 because it is initially classified as a 1, and
the all-white image requires no change to become a 8 because
the initial image is already an 8.
Runtime Analysis. We believe there are two reasons why one
may consider the runtime performance of adversarial example
generation algorithms important: first, to understand if the
performance would be prohibitive for an adversary to actually
mount the attacks, and second, to be used as an inner loop in
11
Best Case Average Case Worst Case
MNIST CIFAR MNIST CIFAR MNIST CIFAR
mean prob mean prob mean prob mean prob mean prob mean prob
Our L0 8.5 100% 5.9 100% 16 100% 13 100% 33 100% 24 100%
JSMA-Z 20 100% 20 100% 56 100% 58 100% 180 98% 150 100%
JSMA-F 17 100% 25 100% 45 100% 110 100% 100 100% 240 100%
Our L2 1.36 100% 0.17 100% 1.76 100% 0.33 100% 2.60 100% 0.51 100%
Deepfool 2.11 100% 0.85 100% − - − - − - − -
Our L∞ 0.13 100% 0.0092 100% 0.16 100% 0.013 100% 0.23 100% 0.019 100%
Fast Gradient Sign 0.22 100% 0.015 99% 0.26 42% 0.029 51% − 0% 0.34 1%
Iterative Gradient Sign 0.14 100% 0.0078 100% 0.19 100% 0.014 100% 0.26 100% 0.023 100%
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF THE THREE VARIANTS OF TARGETED ATTACK TO PREVIOUS WORK FOR OUR MNIST AND CIFAR MODELS. WHEN SUCCESS RATE IS
NOT 100%, THE MEAN IS ONLY OVER SUCCESSES.
Untargeted Average Case Least Likely
mean prob mean prob mean prob
Our L0 48 100% 410 100% 5200 100%
JSMA-Z - 0% - 0% - 0%
JSMA-F - 0% - 0% - 0%
Our L2 0.32 100% 0.96 100% 2.22 100%
Deepfool 0.91 100% - - - -
Our L∞ 0.004 100% 0.006 100% 0.01 100%
FGS 0.004 100% 0.064 2% - 0%
IGS 0.004 100% 0.01 99% 0.03 98%
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF THE THREE VARIANTS OF TARGETED ATTACK TO
PREVIOUS WORK FOR THE INCEPTION V3 MODEL ON IMAGENET. WHEN
SUCCESS RATE IS NOT 100%, THE MEAN IS ONLY OVER SUCCESSES.
adversarial re-training [11].
Comparing the exact runtime of attacks can be misleading.
For example, we have parallelized the implementation of
our L2 adversary allowing it to run hundreds of attacks
simultaneously on a GPU, increasing performance from 10×
to 100×. However, we did not parallelize our L0 or L∞
attacks. Similarly, our implementation of fast gradient sign
is parallelized, but JSMA is not. We therefore refrain from
giving exact performance numbers because we believe an
unfair comparison is worse than no comparison.
All of our attacks, and all previous attacks, are plenty
efficient to be used by an adversary. No attack takes longer
than a few minutes to run on any given instance.
When compared to L0, our attacks are 2 × −10× slower
than our optimized JSMA algorithm (and significantly faster
than the un-optimized version). Our attacks are typically 10×
−100× slower than previous attacks for L2 and L∞, with
exception of iterative gradient sign which we are 10× slower.
VIII. EVALUATING DEFENSIVE DISTILLATION
Distillation was initially proposed as an approach to reduce
a large model (the teacher) down to a smaller distilled model
[19]. At a high level, distillation works by first training the
teacher model on the training set in a standard manner. Then,
we use the teacher to label each instance in the training set with
soft labels (the output vector from the teacher network). For
example, while the hard label for an image of a hand-written
digit 7 will say it is classified as a seven, the soft labels might
say it has a 80% chance of being a seven and a 20% chance
of being a one. Then, we train the distilled model on the soft
labels from the teacher, rather than on the hard labels from
the training set. Distillation can potentially increase accuracy
on the test set as well as the rate at which the smaller model
learns to predict the hard labels [19], [30].
Defensive distillation uses distillation in order to increase
the robustness of a neural network, but with two significant
changes. First, both the teacher model and the distilled model
are identical in size — defensive distillation does not result
in smaller models. Second, and more importantly, defensive
distillation uses a large distillation temperature (described
below) to force the distilled model to become more confident
in its predictions.
Recall that, the softmax function is the last layer of a neural
network. Defensive distillation modifies the softmax function
to also include a temperature constant T :
softmax(x, T )i =
exi/T∑
j e
xj/T
It is easy to see that softmax(x, T ) = softmax(x/T, 1). Intu-
itively, increasing the temperature causes a “softer” maximum,
and decreasing it causes a “harder” maximum. As the limit
of the temperature goes to 0, softmax approaches max; as
the limit goes to infinity, softmax(x) approaches a uniform
distribution.
Defensive distillation proceeds in four steps:
1) Train a network, the teacher network, by setting the
temperature of the softmax to T during the training
phase.
2) Compute soft labels by apply the teacher network to
each instance in the training set, again evaluating the
softmax at temperature T .
3) Train the distilled network (a network with the same
shape as the teacher network) on the soft labels, using
softmax at temperature T .
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4) Finally, when running the distilled network at test time
(to classify new inputs), use temperature 1.
A. Fragility of existing attacks
We briefly investigate the reason that existing attacks fail
on distilled networks, and find that existing attacks are very
fragile and can easily fail to find adversarial examples even
when they exist.
L-BFGS and Deepfool fail due to the fact that the gradient
of F (·) is zero almost always, which prohibits the use of the
standard objective function.
When we train a distilled network at temperature T and
then test it at temperature 1, we effectively cause the inputs to
the softmax to become larger by a factor of T . By minimizing
the cross entropy during training, the output of the softmax
is forced to be close to 1.0 for the correct class and 0.0 for
all others. Since Z(·) is divided by T , the distilled network
will learn to make the Z(·) values T times larger than they
otherwise would be. (Positive values are forced to become
about T times larger; negative values are multiplied by a
factor of about T and thus become even more negative.)
Experimentally, we verified this fact: the mean value of the
L1 norm of Z(·) (the logits) on the undistilled network is
5.8 with standard deviation 6.4; on the distilled network (with
T = 100), the mean is 482 with standard deviation 457.
Because the values of Z(·) are 100 times larger, when
we test at temperature 1, the output of F becomes  in all
components except for the output class which has confidence
1−9 for some very small  (for tasks with 10 classes). In fact,
in most cases,  is so small that the 32-bit floating-point value
is rounded to 0. For similar reasons, the gradient is so small
that it becomes 0 when expressed as a 32-bit floating-point
value.
This causes the L-BFGS minimization procedure to fail to
make progress and terminate. If instead we run L-BFGS with
our stable objective function identified earlier, rather than the
objective function lossF,l(·) suggested by Szegedy et al. [46],
L-BFGS does not fail. An alternate approach to fixing the
attack would be to set
F ′(x) = softmax(Z(x)/T )
where T is the distillation temperature chosen. Then mini-
mizing lossF ′,l(·) will not fail, as now the gradients do not
vanish due to floating-point arithmetic rounding. This clearly
demonstrates the fragility of using the loss function as the
objective to minimize.
JSMA-F (whereby we mean the attack uses the output of
the final layer F (·)) fails for the same reason that L-BFGS
fails: the output of the Z(·) layer is very large and so softmax
becomes essentially a hard maximum. This is the version of the
attack that Papernot et al. use to attack defensive distillation
in their paper [39].
JSMA-Z (the attack that uses the logits) fails for a com-
pletely different reason. Recall that in the Z(·) version of
the attack, we use the input to the softmax for computing
the gradient instead of the final output of the network. This
removes any potential issues with the gradient vanishing,
however this introduces new issues. This version of the attack
is introduced by Papernot et al. [38] but it is not used to attack
distillation; we provide here an analysis of why it fails.
Since this attack uses the Z values, it is important to realize
the differences in relative impact. If the smallest input to
the softmax layer is −100, then, after the softmax layer, the
corresponding output becomes practically zero. If this input
changes from −100 to −90, the output will still be practically
zero. However, if the largest input to the softmax layer is 10,
and it changes to 0, this will have a massive impact on the
softmax output.
Relating this to parameters used in their attack, α and β
represent the size of the change at the input to the softmax
layer. It is perhaps surprising that JSMA-Z works on un-
distilled networks, as it treats all changes as being of equal
importance, regardless of how much they change the softmax
output. If changing a single pixel would increase the target
class by 10, but also increase the least likely class by 15, the
attack will not increase that pixel.
Recall that distillation at temperature T causes the value of
the logits to be T times larger. In effect, this magnifies the sub-
optimality noted above as logits that are extremely unlikely but
have slight variation can cause the attack to refuse to make
any changes.
Fast Gradient Sign fails at first for the same reason L-
BFGS fails: the gradients are almost always zero. However,
something interesting happens if we attempt the same division
trick and divide the logits by T before feeding them to the
softmax function: distillation still remains effective [36]. We
are unable to explain this phenomenon.
B. Applying Our Attacks
When we apply our attacks to defensively distilled net-
works, we find distillation provides only marginal value. We
re-implement defensive distillation on MNIST and CIFAR-10
as described [39] using the same model we used for our eval-
uation above. We train our distilled model with temperature
T = 100, the value found to be most effective [39].
Table VI shows our attacks when applied to distillation. All
of the previous attacks fail to find adversarial examples. In
contrast, our attack succeeds with 100% success probability
for each of the three distance metrics.
When compared to Table IV, distillation has added almost
no value: our L0 and L2 attacks perform slightly worse, and
our L∞ attack performs approximately equally. All of our
attacks succeed with 100% success.
C. Effect of Temperature
In the original work, increasing the temperature was found
to consistently reduce attack success rate. On MNIST, this
goes from a 91% success rate at T = 1 to a 24% success rate
for T = 5 and finally 0.5% success at T = 100.
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Best Case Average Case Worst Case
MNIST CIFAR MNIST CIFAR MNIST CIFAR
mean prob mean prob mean prob mean prob mean prob mean prob
Our L0 10 100% 7.4 100% 19 100% 15 100% 36 100% 29 100%
Our L2 1.7 100% 0.36 100% 2.2 100% 0.60 100% 2.9 100% 0.92 100%
Our L∞ 0.14 100% 0.002 100% 0.18 100% 0.023 100% 0.25 100% 0.038 100%
TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF OUR ATTACKS WHEN APPLIED TO DEFENSIVELY DISTILLED NETWORKS. COMPARE TO TABLE IV FOR UNDISTILLED NETWORKS.
●
●
●
●
● ● ●
● ●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ●
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
Distillation Temperature
M
ea
n 
Ad
ve
rs
a
ria
l D
is
ta
nc
e
Fig. 8. Mean distance to targeted (with random target) adversarial examples
for different distillation temperatures on MNIST. Temperature is uncorrelated
with mean adversarial example distance.
We re-implement this experiment with our improved attacks
to understand how the choice of temperature impacts robust-
ness. We train models with the temperature varied from t = 1
to t = 100.
When we re-run our implementation of JSMA, we observe
the same effect: attack success rapidly decreases. However,
with our improved L2 attack, we see no effect of temperature
on the mean distance to adversarial examples: the correlation
coefficient is ρ = −0.05. This clearly demonstrates the fact
that increasing the distillation temperature does not increase
the robustness of the neural network, it only causes existing
attacks to fail more often.
D. Transferability
Recent work has shown that an adversarial example for one
model will often transfer to be an adversarial on a different
model, even if they are trained on different sets of training data
[46], [11], and even if they use entirely different algorithms
(i.e., adversarial examples on neural networks transfer to
random forests [37]).
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Fig. 9. Probability that adversarial examples transfer from one model to
another, for both targeted (the adversarial class remains the same) and
untargeted (the image is not the correct class).
Therefore, any defense that is able to provide robust-
ness against adversarial examples must somehow break this
transferability property; otherwise, we could run our attack
algorithm on an easy-to-attack model, and then transfer those
adversarial examples to the hard-to-attack model.
Even though defensive distillation is not robust to our
stronger attacks, we demonstrate a second break of distillation
by transferring attacks from a standard model to a defensively
distilled model.
We accomplish this by finding high-confidence adversar-
ial examples, which we define as adversarial examples that
are strongly misclassified by the original model. Instead of
looking for an adversarial example that just barely changes
the classification from the source to the target, we want one
where the target is much more likely than any other label.
Recall the loss function defined earlier for L2 attacks:
f(x′) = max(max{Z(x′)i : i 6= t} − Z(x′)t,−κ).
The purpose of the parameter κ is to control the strength of
adversarial examples: the larger κ, the stronger the classifi-
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Fig. 10. Probability that adversarial examples transfer from the baseline model
to a model trained with defensive distillation at temperature 100.
cation of the adversarial example. This allows us to generate
high-confidence adversarial examples by increasing κ.
We first investigate if our hypothesis is true that the stronger
the classification on the first model, the more likely it will
transfer. We do this by varying κ from 0 to 40.
Our baseline experiment uses two models trained on MNIST
as described in Section IV, with each model trained on half of
the training data. We find that the transferability success rate
increases linearly from κ = 0 to κ = 20 and then plateaus
at near-100% success for κ ≈ 20, so clearly increasing κ
increases the probability of a successful transferable attack.
We then run this same experiment only instead we train
the second model with defensive distillation, and find that
adversarial examples do transfer. This gives us another at-
tack technique for finding adversarial examples on distilled
networks.
However, interestingly, the transferability success rate be-
tween the unsecured model and the distilled model only
reaches 100% success at κ = 40, in comparison to the previous
approach that only required κ = 20.
We believe that this approach can be used in general to
evaluate the robustness of defenses, even if the defense is able
to completely block flow of gradients to cause our gradient-
descent based approaches from succeeding.
IX. CONCLUSION
The existence of adversarial examples limits the areas in
which deep learning can be applied. It is an open problem
to construct defenses that are robust to adversarial examples.
In an attempt to solve this problem, defensive distillation
was proposed as a general-purpose procedure to increase the
robustness of an arbitrary neural network.
In this paper, we propose powerful attacks that defeat
defensive distillation, demonstrating that our attacks more
generally can be used to evaluate the efficacy of potential
defenses. By systematically evaluating many possible attack
approaches, we settle on one that can consistently find better
adversarial examples than all existing approaches. We use this
evaluation as the basis of our three L0, L2, and L∞ attacks.
We encourage those who create defenses to perform the two
evaluation approaches we use in this paper:
• Use a powerful attack (such as the ones proposed in this
paper) to evaluate the robustness of the secured model
directly. Since a defense that prevents our L2 attack will
prevent our other attacks, defenders should make sure to
establish robustness against the L2 distance metric.
• Demonstrate that transferability fails by constructing
high-confidence adversarial examples on a unsecured
model and showing they fail to transfer to the secured
model.
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Fig. 11. Our L0 adversary applied to the CIFAR dataset performing a targeted attack for every source/target pair. Each image is the first image in the dataset
with that label.
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Target Classification (L2)
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Fig. 12. Our L2 adversary applied to the CIFAR dataset performing a targeted attack for every source/target pair. Each image is the first image in the dataset
with that label.
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Target Classification (L∞)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
So
ur
ce
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Fig. 13. Our L∞ adversary applied to the CIFAR dataset performing a targeted attack for every source/target pair. Each image is the first image in the dataset
with that label.
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